

13 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Tom Reckford of Murphy  
Commission Staff

1. On 12 March I met (at his request) with Tom Reckford of the Murphy Commission Staff. After expressing some concern about the contributions to the Commission's intelligence report by Messrs. Harris and Crane, Reckford said that he was the principal author of the report and would continue to be responsible for revising it and staffing it through the Commission. He had heard about some of our concerns with earlier drafts, and wished to discuss them. He was not aware of my earlier talks with Harris and Crane, and, moreover, doesn't look for further inputs to the report from them. Also, he had not seen a copy of my comments on the report. I provided him with a copy and used it as the basis for our discussion.

2. Principal subjects covered in our discussion were:

a. Service Cryptologic Agency relationships to NSA and responsibilities to Service Chiefs. This led into a broad discussion of SIGINT collection activities, electronic warfare activities, management and organizational alternatives, and military force direct support responsibilities. Reckford played a "devil's advocate" role but seemed to be in a learning mode.

b. "ExComizing" of the SIGINT effort and the National SIGINT Plan (NSP). Reckford brought up the ExCom idea, I believe, on the premise of altering the total DoD authority for SIGINT. I recalled the history of earlier discussions on the subject which led to the NSP. He was only vaguely aware of the NSP, but showed interest in pursuing a better understanding of its content, purpose, and application. He ventured the opinion that further issues should be submitted for approval, not only by SecDef and

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USIB/IRAC, but by the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and perhaps the NSC. He obviously has a burning desire to find a mechanism for breaking the SecDef lock on SIGINT in order to reduce the perceived military primacy of the SIGINT effort.

c. Service intelligence personnel strength figures. My charges of inaccuracy in presentation of these figures caused him voluntarily to admit to having used Marchetti as his source because (1) he wanted an unclassified source, and (2) he could not find or obtain the figures elsewhere. We discussed the parameters and history of this problem, and I described the National/Tactical Interface study as our current effort in this area. He obviously thinks that "tactical" and intelligence-related activities of the Military Services are too large to be justified in peacetime, even as military readiness forces, and he is seeking a way to suggest major reductions in these resources. As with the SIGINT effort, I believe his purpose is to reduce military predominance in the total intelligence undertaking in order to permit increased emphasis and effort in other national interests such as political and economic reporting. This aspect would, of course, explain why the Commission is delving into military subjects which appear to have little relation to support of foreign policy. I told him that I am confident the emphasis and degree of effort on economic and political reporting will shift over time as an evolutionary process when the needs are better enunciated and the priorities are better identified.

d. He lamented the fact that senior policy-makers seem so unwilling or unable to influence the nature of the intelligence support which they get. He recognized the ineffectiveness of the NSCIC and is seeking some alternative mechanism to inject more life into the system. Conceptually, he seemed to be thinking of each principal having a senior special assistant who could devote all or more of his time to improving intelligence support. But then he admitted that the personality of the Secretary of State and Presidential Assistant for National Security would have to change before even that kind of structure would work.

3. He noted that the Commission is meeting next Monday and Tuesday to review the Intelligence Structure Report, and he expects it to be completed shortly after that meeting.

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He indicated, however, that he might be back for more discussion, particularly in the military intelligence and SIGINT fields. I agreed to be available.



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